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DLD-073        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3980 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
CRAIG BROWN,  
a/k/a BEY, 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 97-cr-00544-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and the  
Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability 
December 22, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 4, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Craig Brown appeals from the District Court’s orders declining to reconsider its 
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denial of his motion for a modification of his sentence.  For the following reasons, we 
will summarily affirm. 
I. 
  In 1998, Brown was found guilty by a jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
of possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  He was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment.  This Court affirmed 
his judgment of sentence. 
 In June 2009, Brown filed a “motion for adjustment modification of an imposed 
term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 3582(c), (1), (B) predicated upon another 
modifying statute 28 U.S.C. [§] 2255.”  He claimed that he was (1) wrongly sentenced as 
a career offender because the predicate convictions upon which his career offender status 
was based were improperly designated as crimes of violence, see Begay v. United States, 
553 U.S. 137 (2008); United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009); (2) denied 
due process as a result of his improper sentencing; and (3) actually innocent of being a 
career offender.  The District Court treated the motion as a § 2255 motion and denied it 
as untimely. 
 Brown filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing that the District Court 
erred in construing his motion as a § 2255 motion instead of a § 3582 motion.  He was 
subsequently appointed counsel, who filed a second motion for reconsideration.  Counsel 
appeared to agree with the District Court’s characterization of the motion as a § 2255 
motion, but argued that the motion was, in fact, timely and that, alternatively, relief was 
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available to Brown pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  The District Court denied both 
motions for reconsideration.  Brown timely appealed. 
II. 
 “When a § 3582 motion requests the type of relief that § 3582 provides for – that 
is, when the motion argues that sentencing guidelines have been modified to change the 
applicable guidelines used in the defendant’s sentencing – then the motion is rightly 
construed as a motion to amend sentencing pursuant to § 3582.”  United States v. Carter, 
500 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2007).  However, “when a motion titled as a § 3582 motion 
otherwise attacks the petitioner’s underlying conviction or sentence, that is an attack on 
the merits of the case and should be construed as a § 2255 motion.”  Id.; Okereke v. 
United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or 
sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution.”).  
 The District Court properly viewed Brown’s motion as having been brought 
pursuant to § 2255 because the motion attacks his sentence based on an alleged 
constitutional violation and/or a fundamental miscarriage of justice that occurred during 
his sentencing.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).  Indeed, Brown’s own filings confirm that he is 
seeking relief under § 2255 as the “modifying statue” that would permit the court to 
reduce his sentence.
1
  Furthermore, Brown’s contentions that he was inappropriately 
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 Brown’s argument to the contrary is based on § 3582(c)(1)(B), which states that, despite 
§ 3582(c)’s general prohibition against modification of a term of imprisonment, a court is 
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sentenced as a career offender and that his sentence violates the constitution do not 
provide a basis for relief under § 3582(c).   
 Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through § 2241.  A prisoner may 
proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 would be “inadequate of ineffective.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam).  We have held that § 2255’s “safety valve” applies only in rare circumstances, 
such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was 
convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).  Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no 
allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but 
instead asserts only that he is “innocent” of being a career offender.  See Okereke, 307 
F.3d at 120-21 (holding that Dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via 
§ 2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law). 
                                                                                                                                                  
entitled to modify a sentence when “otherwise expressly permitted by statute.”  That 
§ 2255 is among the statutes expressly permitting modification of a sentence does not 
permit Brown to circumvent the requirements applicable to § 2255 motions by 
referencing the provision through § 3582.  Furthermore, although district courts are 
generally required to provide notice to a pro se litigant before re-characterizing a motion 
as a § 2255 motion, see United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1999), it is 
difficult to say that the District Court engaged in any re-characterization here given 
Brown’s express reliance on § 2255.  Regardless, the District Court did not err in failing 
provide notice because the § 2255 motion was untimely, as discussed further below.  See 
United States v. Chew, 284 F.3d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 2002) (no Miller warning was required 
where the statute of limitations already barred petitioner from filing a § 2255 motion at 
the time of re-characterization). 
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 Brown must obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal the District Court’s 
denial of his § 2255 motion.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).  We decline to grant him one 
because reasonable jurists would agree that the District Court correctly dismissed his 
motion as time-barred.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).  A one-year 
statute of limitations applies to § 2255 motions and begins to run on the latest of four 
possible dates, the most common being the date on which the movant’s judgment of 
conviction became final.  § 2255(f)(1).  As Brown’s § 2255 motion was filed 
approximately ten years after his judgment of conviction became final, it is clearly 
untimely under that approach.  Furthermore, none of § 2255(f)’s alternative start dates 
applies nor is there any apparent basis for equitable tolling.    
 For the foregoing reasons, we decline to issue a certificate of appealability with 
respect to the District Court’s denial of Brown’s § 2255 motion and summarily affirm the 
remaining aspects of the District Court’s rulings.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6.   
